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Introduction
Alfred Smith and Galen Black were fired from their jobs at a private
drug rehabilitation center because they ingested peyote' for sacramental
purposes at a religious ceremony. In Oregon, the religiously inspired
use of peyote falls within the prohibition of a criminal statute that does
not make an exception for the sacramental use of this drug.' Even
though they were not prosecuted under the criminal statute, violation
of that statute constituted work-related misconduct.' Thus, the Em-
ployment Division of the Oregon Department of Human Resources
determined these members of the Native American Church ineligible for
unemployment compensation benefits. 4
Copyright 1991, by LOUISIANA LAW REvnEw.
1. Peyote is a hallucinogenic drug derived from mashed cactus tips that has been
used in Indian religious rites since before Columbus. U.S. News & World Report, Apr.
30, 1990 at 15.
2. Or. Rev. Stat. § 475.992(4) (1989).
3. Perhaps it may appear that discharge from employment with a drug rehabilitation
center is entirely appropriate when the discharge is the result of employee drug use.
However, an understanding of Native American Indian peyote ritual reveals that sacra-
mental peyote use is in no way related to the drug abuse that is all too prevalent in
today's society. As the dissenting opinion in the present case pointed out, the carefully
circumscribed sacramental ceremonies in which members of the Native American Church
use peyote is entirely self-contained and carefully regulated by tenets of the religion. The
Native American Church restricts peyote use to a limited ceremonial context while peyote
use for nonreligious purposes is sacrilegious. Furthermore, non-member spectators are not
allowed to observe the peyote ritual. In addition, the availability of peyote for religious
use is strictly controlled by federal regulations. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 821-23; 21 C.F.R. §
1307.31 (1989).
4. The treatment of religious discrimination in employment practices found in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988) is not discussed in this case because the respondents were fired
for violating a criminal statute which prohibited the use of peyote. The respondents'
applications for unemployment compensation were denied under a state law disqualifying
employees for work-related misconduct. The Oregon State Court of Appeals held that
the denials violated the claimants' free exercise rights under the first amendment. The
State Supreme Court affirmed, but the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment
and remanded the case for a determination whether the sacramental use of peyote is,
prohibited by the state's controlled substance law. On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court
held that sacramental peyote use violated, and was not exempt from, the state law
prohibition. Therefore, the court had to decide whether the criminal prohibition itself
violated the respondents' first amendment right to free exercise.
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The United States Supreme Court, in Employment Division, De-
partment of Human Resources v. Smith,5 faced the following question:
[Wlhether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
permits the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote
use within the reach of its general criminal prohibition on use
of that drug, and thus permits the State to deny unemployment
benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of such
religiously inspired use.6
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia,7 held that the
criminal prohibition of peyote use was constitutional even though there
was no exception for religiously motivated use of the drug. Therefore,
"Oregon may, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, deny respondents
unemployment compensation when their dismissal results from use of
the drug." 8 In addition, the balancing test that would require "govern-
mental actions that substantially burden religious practices" to be "jus-
tified by a compelling governmental interest" 9 is inapplicable to an
"across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of con-
duct." 0 The Court reasoned that "if prohibiting the exercise of religion"
is "merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise
valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended."" .
The Supreme Court's decision in Smith signals a new approach to
the interpretation of the free exercise clause of the first amendment.' 2
Under Smith, it appears that whenever a state enacts a criminal law,
or possibly any law that is generally applicable to all citizens, there will
be no relief available under the free exercise clause to those citizens
whose religious practices may be burdened by that law. Instead, these
religious groups must rely on the political process to remedy any burdens
on the practice of their religion. Smith embodies a movement away
from the application of a balancing test that has previously required
the government to show a compelling interest in order to justify placing
a burden on religious activity.
The decision in Smith significantly limits the application of the free
exercise clause. The purpose of this article is to analyze this shift in
doctrine of the Supreme Court in dealing with free exercise claims. In
5. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
6. Id. at 1597.
7. Joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, Stevens and Kennedy, J.J.
8. Smith, I10 S. Ct. at 1606.
9. Id. at 1602.
10. Id. at 1603.
Ii. Id. at 1600.
12. "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]."
U.S. Const. amend. 1.
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addition, this article will discuss the implications of abandoning the
balancing test in cases of a generally applicable law, criminal or oth-
erwise, as well as the implications of leaving the determination of re-
ligious exemptions and the accommodation of religious practices to the
political process.
The Decision in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith 3
The Employment Division of the Department of Human Resources
of Oregon determined that Alfred Smith and Galen Black were ineligible
for unemployment compensation because they were fired for work-related
"misconduct.'"' Their use of peyote "for sacramental purposes at a
ceremony of the Native American Church, of which both are mem-
bers,"" was the reason for their discharge from employment with a
private drug rehabilitation organization.' 6
The knowing or intentional possession of a "controlled substance"
is prohibited by Oregon law, unless the substance is prescribed by a
medical practitioner." The law defines a "controlled substance" as a
drug classified in Schedules I through V of the Federal Controlled
Substances Act,'" as modified by the Oregon State Board of Pharmacy. 19
The drug peyote is listed as a Schedule I drug.20 The Oregon Supreme
Court held that religiously inspired peyote use was within the prohibition
of the Oregon statute, which "makes no exception for the sacramental
use" of the drug. 2'
The United States Supreme Court held that "[b]ecause respondents'
ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon law, and because that
prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consistent with the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, deny respondents unemployment compensation when their
dismissal results from use of the drug."2 Furthermore, Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith23 marked a departure
from prior approaches to free exercise claims by holding the balancing
test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner" inapplicable in a free exercise
13. I10 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
14. Id. at 1598.
15. Id. at 1597.
16. See supra text accompanying note 4.
17. Or. Rev. Stat. § 475.992(4) (1989).
18. 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-12 (1991).
19. Or. Rev. Stat. § 475.005(6) (1989).
20. Or. Admin. Rule 855-80-021 (3)(5) (1988).
21. -Smith v. Employment Div., 307 Or. 68, 72-73, 763 P.2d 146, 148 (1988).
22. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1606 (1990).
.23. Id.
24. 374 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790 (1963).
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challenge to an "across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular
form of conduct. ' ' 2 The Sherbert balancing test required the state to
demonstrate a compelling governmental interest with no alternative means
to achieve that interest in order to justify a burden on the free exercise
of religion.
The Court ultimately concluded that "if prohibiting the exercise of
religion [is] merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and
otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been of-
fended." 26
The majority relied on past decisions 7 that, in their opinion, "con-
sistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual
of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct
that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."' '1 2  Furthermore, the Court
distinguished cases that barred application of generally applicable laws
to religiously motivated action29 on the ground that these cases involved
"the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional pro-
tections, such as freedom of speech and of the press." 30 In addition,
the majority relied on the belief that "[ojur cases do not at their farthest
reach support the proposition that a stance of conscientious opposition
relieves an objector from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic
government." 3'
In holding the balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner32 in-
applicable to a general criminal prohibition on a particular form of
conduct, the Court distinguished cases in which this test has been applied
to invalidate governmental action33 on the grounds that each dealt with
"state unemployment compensation rules that conditioned the availability
of benefits upon an applicant's willingness to work under conditions
forbidden by his religion.' "3 The test in Sherbert, the Court reasoned,
25. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
26. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
27. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S. Ct. 1051 (1982); Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437, 91 S. Ct. 828 (1971); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.
Ct. 1144 (1961); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S. Ct. 438 (1944).
28. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
29. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972); Follet v. McCormick,
321 U.S. 573, 64 S. Ct. 717 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S. Ct.
870 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900 (1940); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925).
30. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601.
31. Id. at 1602.
32. 374 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790 (1963).
33. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 107
S. Ct. 1046 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., Indiana Employment Div., 450 U.S. 707, 101
S. Ct. 1425 (1981).
34. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602.
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"was developed in a context that lent itself to individualized govern-
mental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct."" Although
the Sherbert test has been used to analyze free exercise challenges to
general criminal prohibitions on particular forms of conduct3 6 the Court
has never applied the test to invalidate one."7 Finally, the Court con-
sidered that making an individual's obligation to obey such a criminal
prohibition contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious
beliefs, except where the state has a compelling interest, would be
allowing him, by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law unto himself."38
Thus, under Smith, a state does not have to demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest in order to justify any substantial burden on
religious practice when the religious burden results from a generally
applicable criminal provision. In fact, when the burden comes from
such a provision, Smith seems to indicate that the free exercise clause
of the first amendment is not even implicated. Instead, protection of
religious practices is left to the political process. This reliance on the
political process stems from the majority's adamant opposition to federal
judges balancing the importance of general laws against the significance
of religious activities. Perhaps there is also an underlying fear that
mandating a religious exception to Oregon's drug laws for sacramental
peyote use will open up the courts to countless claims for religious
accommodation and perhaps the establishment of religious doctrines to
evade generally applicable criminal laws. In the majority's view, state
legislatures are the proper forum for such debates.
Although Justice O'Connor agreed with the result reached by the
majority, she adamantly opposed its approach. In a concurring opinion,
she criticized the Court's "strained reading of the First Amendment...
(and] disregard [fori our consistent application of free exercise doctrine
to cases involving generally applicable regulations that burden religious
conduct." 9 Furthermore, she stated that "[ilt is difficult to deny that
a law that prohibits religiously motivated conduct, even if the law is
generally applicable, does not at least implicate First Amendment con-
cerns. "4 The better approach, in O'Connor's view, would be to respect
"both the First Amendment's express textual mandate and the govern-
mental interest in regulation of conduct by requiring the Government
to justify any substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a
35, Id. at 1603.
36. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S. Ct. 1051 (1982); Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437, 91 S. Ct. 828 (1971).
37. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
38. Id. (quoting Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879)).
39. Id. at 1607 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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compelling state interest and by means narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.""
History of Religious Exemptions Under Free Exercise Clause
In order to understand the significance of the approach taken by
the Court in Smith, it is necessary to examine prior cases in which the
Court dealt with free exercise challenges. The cases in this section will
be presented chronologically in order to identify the evolution of the
Court's approach to free exercise claims.
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... -"4 In an 1878 decision,
Reynolds v. United States,'3 the United States Supreme Court handed
down its first interpretation of the free exercise clause by upholding the
conviction of a Mormon for violating a federal prohibition of polygamy.
This interpretation included the notion that although laws "cannot in-
terfere with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may with prac-
tices."" The Court maintained this religious belief-action distinction,
whereby religiously motivated conduct was not protected under the free
exercise clause, until 1963.
The Court followed the Reynolds belief-action distinction in Braun-
feld v. Brown.4 However, Braunfeld introduced a balancing process in
determining the constitutionality of imposing an indirect burden on
religious activity by enacting a law that regulates secular activity. In
this case, it was held that the free exercise clause was not violated by
Sunday closing laws as applied to members of the Orthodox Jewish
faith (which requires the closing of their places of business each Friday
until nightfall on Saturday) even though enforcement of the statute
would impair the ability of these merchants to earn a livelihood or
would render them unable to continue in their businesses. The majority
considered the indirect burden placed on Orthodox Jews constitutionally
acceptable because the criminal statute did not deny the freedom to
hold religious views, but simply made religious views more expensive.4
By engaging in a balancing process, the Court weighed the state interest
in requiring businesses to close on Sundays against the indirect burden
on the religious observance of Orthodox Jews as well as the economic
burden placed upon them. Another factor considered in this balancing
41. Id.
42. U.S. Const. amend. I (emphasis added).
43. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
44. Id. at 166.
45. 366 U.S. 599, 81 S. Ct. 1144 (1961).
46. Id. at 605, 81 S. Ct. at 1147.
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process was the existence, or lack thereof, of an alternative means by
which the state could have accomplished its purpose without imposing
such a burden on religious observance. The Court found that the state
had a legitimate interest in setting apart "a day when the hectic tempo
of everyday existence ceases and a more pleasant atmosphere is cre-
ated." '4 7 Furthermore, the Sunday closing laws were valid since the state
conceivably could not accomplish this purpose by any means that did
not impose such an indirect burden on religious observance.4 8
Only two years later, in 1963, the Court expanded this balancing
test. In order to impose a burden on the free exercise of religion, this
approach required that a state demonstrate both the existence of a
compelling governmental interest and the lack of an alternative means
to achieve this interest. This same decision also formally abandoned the
belief-action distinction and extended free religiously motivated conduct.
In Sherbert v. Verner, 49 a Seventh-day Adventist was denied unemploy-
ment compensation benefits after being fired for refusing to work on
Saturdays. The Court held that the disqualification for benefits clearly
imposed a burden on the free exercise of the claimant's religion. The
Court found that "condition[ing] the availability of benefits upon this
appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious
faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liber-
ties." 0 In order to justify this burden, the Court stated, there must be
a compelling state interest in enforcing the eligibility provision and no
alternative form of regulation to achieve that interest without infringing
on first amendment rights." The majority found no sufficient justifi-
cation to warrant the substantial infringement on the claimant's religious
liberties. The Court distinguished this case from Braunfeld and applied
the expanded balancing test to reach a different result. The Court stated
that, in Braunfeld, the state showed a strong interest in providing one
uniform day of rest for all workers and that the only way to achieve
this end was to declare Sunday to be that day. Furthermore, an ex-
emption for Sabbitarians in Braunfeld would have rendered the statutory
scheme unworkable.
In formally abandoning the belief-action distinction, the Court stated
that forcing Sherbert to choose between "following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits ... [or] ... abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion in order to accept work" '52 imposed "the same
kind of burden upon free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed
47. Id. at 607, 81 S. Ct. at 1148.
48. Id. at 608, 81 S. Ct. at 1148.
49. 374 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790 (1963).
50. Id. at 406, 83 S. Ct. at 1795.
51. Id. at 406-07, 83 S. Ct. at 1795-96.
52. Id. at 404, 83 S. Ct. at 1794.
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against ... Saturday worship."" The state could not impose this burden,
although indirect, unless an exemption "would have rendered the entire
statutory scheme unworkable.'" 4 Thus, Sherbert seemed to mark the
beginning of a potentially expansive interpretation of the free exercise
clause by requiring the state to show a compelling interest in order to
justify a burden on religious activity and by abandoning the belief-
action distinction.
Sherbert's extension of the free exercise clause to religious activities
and the emerging balancing process did not automatically guarantee
religious accommodation. Subsequent decisions revealed that the ap-
proach in Sherbert did not always favor the challenger to laws that
interfered with the free exercise of religion. In Gillette v. United States,"
the balancing test set forth in Sherbert was used in refusing accom-
modation under the free exercise clause to conscientious objectors whose
religion required them to refrain from participation in wars they con-
sidered unjust. The Court determined that the religious burden in this
case was justified by substantial governmental interests in defense and
the power to raise armies.5 6 However, when members of the Amish faith
who refused to send their children to school after they had completed
the eighth grade were convicted for violating Wisconsin's compulsory
school attendance law that required children to attend school until the
age of sixteen, the Court used the Sherbert balancing test to carve out
an exemption to this law. The majority in Wisconsin v. Yoder"l stated:
only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise
served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion. We can accept it as settled, therefore, that, however
strong the State's interest in universal compulsory education, it
is by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of
all other interests. 58
The Court concluded that exempting the Amish from one or two
years of compulsory education would not impair the physical or mental
health of the children, result in their inability to be self-supporting or
to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other
way materially detract from the welfare of society.59 In making this
determination, the Court relied heavily upon the fact that the Amish
provide informal vocational training for children after completion of
53. Id., 83 S. Ct. at 1794.
54. Id. at 409, 83 S. Ct. at 1796.
55. 401 U.S. 437, 91 S. Ct. 828 (1971).
56. Id. at 462, 91 S. Ct. at 842-43.
57. 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972).
58. Id. at 215, 92 S. Ct. at 1533.
59. Id. at 234, 92 S. Ct. at 1542.
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the eighth grade. In light of the decision in Smith, an important aspect
of Yoder is that, along with the free exercise of religion, the Court
recognized the right of parents to direct the upbringing and education
of their children.6
In 1981, the Court reaffirmed Sherbert in Thomas v. Review Board,
Indiana Employment Security Division.63 A Jehovah's Witness was denied
unemployment benefits after he quit his job at a steel production plant
because his transfer to another department involved him more directly
in the production of munitions, which was contrary to his religious
beliefs. The Court noted that "a regulation neutral on its face may, in
its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for
governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of relig-
ion." 62 The majority further stated that, just as in Sherbert, the employee
was "put to a choice between fidelity to religious belief or cessation of
work. ' ' 63 Because a state may justify a burden on religious practice only
by "showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some
compelling state interest," the Court concluded that the asserted state
interest in avoiding widespread unemployment and its consequent burden
on the unemployment compensation fund did not justify the burden
placed on the free exercise of religion.
In his dissenting opinion in Thomas, Justice Rehnquist expressed
his disagreement with the Court's "overly expansive interpretation ' 6 of
the religion clauses of the first amendment. He advocated a return to
the approach taken in Braunfeld v. Brown" and the dissent in Sherbert
v. Verner.6 7 Quoting Braunfeld, Justice Rehnquist stated that "[tlo strike
down without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes only
an indirect burden on the exercise of religion, legislation which does
not make unlawful the religious practice itself, would radically restrict
the operating latitude of the legislature. ' 68 In addition, Justice Rehnquist
quoted the dissent in Sherbert which stated that "[tihose situations in
which the Constitution may require special treatment on account of
religion are . . . few and far between." 69
In Thomas, the Court simply brushed over the contention that
mandating benefit payments to Thomas involved the state in fostering
60. Id. at 231, 92 S. Ct. at 1541.
61. 450 U.S. 707, 101 S. Ct., 1425 (1981).
62. Id. at 717, 101 S. Ct. at 1431 (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220, 92 S. Ct. at
1535).
63. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717, 101 S. Ct. at 1431-32.
64. Id. at 718, 101 S. Ct. at 1432.
65. Id. at 721, 101 S. Ct. at 1433 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. 366 U.S. 599, 81 S. Ct. 11,4 (1961).
67. 374 U.S. 698, 83 S. Ct. 1790 (1963).
68. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 722-723, 101 S. Ct. at 1434.
69. Id. at 723, 101 S. Ct. at 1434.
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a religious faith in violation of the establishment clause of the first
amendment.10 Justice Rehnquist stated in his dissent that this decision
is inconsistent with the Court's prior interpretation of the establishment
clause. Indeed, he reasoned that had a state voluntarily chosen to grant
benefits to Thomas, rather than having been forced by the Court to
do so, the establishment clause as previously interpreted would have
been violated. Although a complete analysis of the Court's interpretation
of the establishment clause is beyond the scope of this article, it is
important to note the reason Justice Rehnquist thought Thomas was
inconsistent with this interpretation. A three-prong test has emerged in
the Court's analysis of the establishment clause claims. First, the statute
being attacked must serve a secular legislative purpose. Second, the law
must have a primary effect that neither advances nor prohibits religion.
And third, states must avoid excessive entanglement with religion.,,
Under this test, the result in Thomas, as well as any other case in which
religious accommodation under the free exercise clause is granted either
by the state legislatures or the Court, clearly runs afoul of the estab-
lishment clause of the first amendment. 71 According to Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent in Thomas, these inconsistent results would be avoided
by interpreting the religion clauses of the first amendment in conjunction
with one another.
A later decision in which the Court used the Sherbert balancing test
to find that the burden on religious activity was justified by a compelling
state interest was United States v. Lee." In this case, the Court refused
to exempt an Amish farmer from payment of Social Security taxes,
holding that the state's interest in collecting taxes justified the burden
on the claimant's religious belief.
In Goldman v. Weinberger,74 the Court seemed to retreat from the
expansive interpretation of the free exercise clause seen in the Sherbert
test. In this case, the Court held that the application of an Air Force
regulation that prohibited the wearing of headgear while indoors to an
Orthodox Jew wearing a yarmulke (skullcap) did not violate the first
amendment. An important aspect of Goldman was the military context
in which it arose, indicating the beginning of what appears to be a
categorical approach to free exercise claims." The Court in Goldman
stated:
70. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . U.S.
Const. amend. 1.
71. See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 93 S. Ct. 2955
(1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602. 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971). See also J. Nowak,
R. Rotunda, J. Young, Constitutional Law 1033 (3d ed. 1986).
72. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 726, 101 S. Ct. at 1436.
73. 455 U.S. 252, 102 S. Ct. 1051 (1982).
74. 475 U.S. 503, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
75. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1611-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment
grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of
similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society. The
military need not encourage debate or tolerate protest to the
extent that such tolerance is required of the civilian state by
the First Amendment .... 76
The same year, in Bowen v. Roy, 7 the Court displayed yet another
retreat from its prior attitude towards religious accommodation. The
parents of a Native American child claimed that a statutory requirement
that conditioned receipt of certain welfare benefits on the parents' pro-
viding the state agency with a social security number for the child
violated their free exercise of rights. The parents' objection to the
requirement was based on their religious belief that the use of a number
to identify the child would rob her of her spirit." The Court held that
the federal statutory requirement that state welfare agencies, in admin-
istering Aid For Dependent Children benefits, must utilize the social
security numbers of recipients of benefits did not violate the free exercise
clause. Three members of the Court noted that the requirement was
wholly neutral in religious terms, applied to all persons who sought
benefits from the government, and was a reasonable means of achieving
the goal of preventing fraud in benefit programs.7 9 This statement ad-
vocated a lower standard of review than previously set forth in Sherbert.
A significant aspect of Bowen was that the majority noted that the free
exercise clause does not require the government to conduct its own
internal affairs in ways to comport with the religious beliefs of particular
citizens. Furthermore, the Court found that the use by the government
of the number issued to the child did not in itself impair her father's
freedom to believe, express, and exercise his religion. 0
The results in both Goldman and Bowen could have been reached
by simply applying the balancing test enunciated in Sherbert. Thus, these
cases were significant in that the Court chose instead to analyze these
free exercise claims without applying the Sherbert test at all.
An additional signal of the Court's emerging categorical approach
to free exercise claims is found in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,s1 which
arose in a prison context. In this case, the Court held that state prison
regulations effectively preventing Muslim inmates from attending weekly
76. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507, 106 S. Ct. at 1313.
77. 476 U.S. 693, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986). 0
78. The fact was disclosed at trial that a social security number had already been
issued in the child's name. Id. at 697, 106 S. Ct. at 2151.
79. Id. at 709-10, 106 S. Ct. at 2157.
80. Id. at 700, 106 S. Ct. at 2152.
81. 482 U.S. 342, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987).
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religious services did not violate the free exercise clause. The majority
stated that the regulations were justified by concerns of security, insti-
tutional order, and rehabilitation." The Court also declared that the
prison officials did not have the burden of proving that no reasonable
alternative method existed by which the inmates' religious rights could
be accommodated without creating bona fide security problems. 83 The
approach here also seemed to be a relaxing of the standard of review
in free exercise challenges. However, the Court noted that this lower
standard of review is a result of the prison context in which the case
arose. Under this standard, a regulation is valid if it is reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests.
In Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida," the
Court was faced with another set of facts almost indistinguishable from
those of Sherbert and Thomas. The main difference was that, in Hobbie,
the claimant was discharged from her employment for refusal to work
on the Sabbath because of the sincerely held religious beliefs which she
adopted after beginning employment. In its third free exercise case
dealing with unemployment compensation benefits, the Court again held
that the denial of the claimant's unemployment compensation benefits
violated the free exercise clause. In addition, the Court clarified the
seemingly misunderstood language of Bowen v. Roy85 by reaffirming the
application of the balancing test as set forth in Sherbert. Hobbie held
that a burden on religion can be justified only by proof by the state
of a compelling interest. In addition, the Court declared that the state
does not meet its burden when it only demonstrates that a requirement
for government benefits, neutral and uniform in its application, is a
reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest.8 6
Finally, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Associ-
ation,8" the Court held that the free exercise clause does not bar the
federal government from allowing timber harvesting or road construction
in national forest lands which are used by Indians for religious purposes.
The five justices joining in the majority found that the incidental effects
of governmental programs which may make certain religious practices
more difficult, but have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting
contrary to their religious beliefs, do not require the government to
bring forward a compelling justification for otherwise lawful actions.8
The Court noted that although some citizens may find certain government
82. Id. at 350-51, 107 S. Ct. at 2405.
83. Id. at 350, 107 S. Ct. at 2405.
84. 480 U.S. 136, 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987).
85. 476 U.S. 693, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
86. Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141, 107 S. Ct. at 1049.
87. 485 U.S. 439, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
88. Id. at 450, 108 S. Ct. at 1326.
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actions incompatible with their own search for spiritual fulfillment and
with the tenets of their religion, the first amendment must apply to all
citizens alike.
Analysis of the Smith Decision
Shift in Doctrine
The Supreme Court's decision in Smith 9 signifies a shift in its
interpretation of the free exercise clause. At first blush, this approach
seems to give the states freedom to unduly burden religious activity as
long as they do so under the guise of a generally applicable law. The
majority dismissed this possibility, however, when it noted that laws
aimed specifically at burdening forms of conduct when engaged in only
for religious reasons or because they display religious beliefs would no
doubt be unconstitutional.90 However, as Justice O'Connor explained in
her concurring opinion, "few States would be so naive as to enact a
law directly prohibiting or burdening a religious practice as such." 9'
Under Smith, a state could enforce its alcohol consumption laws against
children who drink wine at communion services. As long as the law
prohibited all minors from consuming alcoholic beverages, it appears
that the first amendment would not even be implicated. This example
illustrates one of the difficulties surrounding the rejection of prior ju-
risprudence with the declaration that the free exercise clause is not
offended by a generally applicabie and otherwise valid provision that
incidentally prohibits or burdens the exercise of religion.
One aspect of the Court's shift in doctrine in Smith is its refusal
to apply the balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner. 92 According
to the majority, states are no longer required to demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest in order to justify a substantial burden on religious
practice when the burden results from a generally applicable criminal
provision.9 In light of Smith, such cases no longer seem to implicate
first amendment concerns.
Another significant aspect of this shift in doctrine is the resurrection
of the belief-action distinction. Because religious accommodation is no
longer available to protect religious activity from generally applicable
criminal laws, only beliefs will be afforded free exercise protection.
The approach in Sherbert, when applied only to unemployment
compensation cases, may have survived Smith. The majority in ,Smith
89. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
90. Id. at 1599.
91. Id. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
92. 374 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790 (1963).
93. Smith, I10 S. Ct. at 1603.
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distinguished Sherbert and the line of cases that followed it94 on several
grounds. First, the conduct at issue in those cases was not prohibited
by law. Secondly, the Sherbert test was "developed in a context. that
lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for
the relevant conduct." 95 The Court noted, as did a plurality of the
Court in Bowen v. Roy,96 that "a distinctive feature of unemployment
compensation programs is that their eligibility criteria invite consideration
of the particular circumstances behind an applicant's unemploy-
ment . . . ."' In deciding Smith, the Court succinctly stated that even
if it was "inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the un-
employment compensation field, we would not apply it to require ex-
emptions from a generally applicable criminal law."" The majority
further relied on the fact that every free exercise case outside the
unemployment compensation context which purported to apply the Sher-
bert test found the governmental interest compelling enough to justify
the religious burden. 99 In addition, the Court noted recent free exercise
cases outside the unemployment compensation field where the Sherbert
test was not applied at all.'0 In light of the Court's approach in Smith
however, whether the balancing test in Sherbert will continue to be
applied even in unemployment compensation cases remains to be seen.
There is the possibility that these determinations as well will eventually
be left to the political process.
By completely abandoning the Sherbert test in cases outside the
unemployment compensation field, the Court has adopted an extremely
narrow interpretation of the free exercise clause. By holding the clause
inapplicable to challenges of generally applicable criminal laws, the Court
has retreated to the limited interpretation of the free exercise clause
before 1963 when Sherbert was decided. Taking away free exercise
protection from a criminal law forces one to choose between refraining
from acting on firmly embedded religious beliefs or facing possible
imprisonment. Under Smith, the free exercise clause provides protection
only from specific regulations of religious beliefs and laws aimed directly
at actions with a religious purpose, or free exercise claims in conjunction
94. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 107
S. Ct. 1046 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., Indiana Employment Div., 450 U.S. 707, 101
S. Ct. 1425 (1981).
95. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
96. 476 U.S. 693, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
97. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1602.
100. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 108 S.
Ct. 1319 (1988); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987);
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
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with another constitutionally protected right. In the words of Justice
O'Connor:
The Court today . . . interprets the Clause to permit the gov-
ernment to prohibit, without justification, conduct mandated by
an individual's religious beliefs, so long as that prohibition is
generally applicable. But a. law that prohibits certain conduct-
conduct that happens to be an act of worship for someone-
manifestly does prohibit that person's free exercise of his relig-
ion. A person who is barred from engaging in religiously mo-
tivated conduct is barred from freely exercising his religion.
Moreover, that person is barred from freely exercising his religion
regardless of whether that law prohibits the conduct only when
engaged in for religious reasons, only by members of that re-
ligion, or by all persons.'0
Nevertheless, in light of Smith, when the law prohibiting religiously
motivated conduct is applicable to all persons, the first amendment is
deemed not offended.
This new approach to free exercise claims is a vindication of the
views expressed by Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion in Thomas
v. Review Board, Indiana Employment Security Division.02 In his opin-
ion, Sherbert,0' Thomas and later Hobbie'°4 interpreted the free exercise
clause more broadly than warranted. In his view, where "a State has
enacted a general statute, the purpose and effect of which is to advance
the State's secular goals, the Free Exercise Clause does not ... require
the State to conform that statute to the dictates of religious conscience
of any group."10 - Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist believes that although
a state is free to choose to grant exemptions from these laws to religious
persons, it is not constitutionally compelled to do so.0 6
The decision in Smith also embodies a categorical approach to free
exercise claims rather than a case-by-case analysis. Such an approach is
intended to remove federal judges from the practice of weighing the
importance of laws of general applicability against the significance of
religious practices. For example, the majority explicitly singled out un-
employment compensation cases for application of the Sherbert balancing
test. The holding in Smith provides us with yet another category: gen-
erally applicable criminal prohibitions. Challenges to such laws do not
even seem to implicate free exercise concerns.
101. Smith. 110 S. Ct. at 1608 (O'Connor, I., concurring).
102. 450 U.S. 707, 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981).
103. 374 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790 (1963).
104. 480 U.S. 136, 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987).
105. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 723, 101 S. Ct. at 1,434.
106. Id., 101 S. Ct. at 1434.
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The trend toward categorical classification of free exercise claims
started in 1971 in Gillette v. United States.'t" The Court relied on the
military context in which this case arose to deny relief to religious
conscientious objectors to particular wars. The military cases category
was further endorsed in the 1986 decision in Goldman v. Weinberger'08
in which the Court held that the free exercise clause was not violated
by application of an Air Force regulation prohibiting wearing of headgear
while indoors to an Orthodox Jew's wearing of a yarmulke. The major
difference between these two military cases is that Gillette utilized the
balancing test (finding that the government's interest in procuring the
manpower necessary for military purposes of raising and supporting
armies justified the burden placed on religious objectors), and Goldman
failed to apply the balancing test at all and relied on deference to the
professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative
importance of a particular military interest. Under this view, military
regulations and prohibitions are virtually immune from free exercise
challenges.
Another category of free exercise claims that has been singled out
for special treatment by the Court is that involving challenges to the
federal tax system. In United States v. Lee'°9 and Hernandez v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue," ° the Court refused to extend religious
exemptions from payment of taxes. Although both Lee and Hernandez
were decided by application of the balancing test established in Sherbert
v. Verner, these cases can be seen as a signal of the Court's refusal to
extend religious accommodation to certain categories of claims. Now
that the Sherbert balancing test seems to have been abandoned in all
cases except those which arise in the unemployment compensation field,
the Court apparently has no choice but to decide that all free exercise
challenges to neutral, generally applicable tax laws must fail. This notion
is one example of the possibility that Smith could be extended beyond
generally applicable criminal laws to any neutral and otherwise valid
law of general applicability, regardless of its nature or the potential
reasons for requiring a religious exemption from the law.
A third category of free exercise claims is that found in O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz:"' prison cases. In O'Lone the Court upheld a prison's
refusal to exclude inmates from work requirements so that they could
attend worship services. The Sherbert balancing test was not even men-
tioned in this case. In light of this decision, the Court seems to consider
107. 401 U.S. 437, 91 S. Ct. 828 (1971).
108. 475 U.S. 503. 106 S. C. 1310 (1986).
109. 455 U.S. 252, 102 S. Ct. 1051 (1982).
110. 490 U.S. 680, 109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989).
111. 482 U.S. 342, 107 S. Ct. 240 (1987).
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the need for institutional order and security in prisons as an overriding
objective, even when the inmates' free exercise of religion may be
infringed. The Court seemed to overlook the fact that although lawful
incarceration necessarily includes withdrawal or limitation of many priv-
ileges and rights justified by the considerations underlying our penal
system," 2 prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason
of their conviction and imprisonment. ' Since the Court in O'Lone
failed to apply the Sherbert balancing test and instead merely considered
the reasonableness of the prison regulations, there is a possibility that
in the future, any generally applicable prison regulation could be upheld
under the rationale of Smith.
The application of the Smith decision to-criminal law creates yet
another category of free exercise claims to which the Court refuses to
extend protection in the form of religious accommodation. Additionally,
the possibility remains that Smith could be extended to embrace all
neutral, generally applicable laws. This extension would eliminate al-
together judicial challenges to general laws on free exercise grounds. No
longer would there be an inquiry into the validity or weight of the
competing interests at stake. Rather, there would be a steadfast rule
that any time there is a law of general applicability that does not directly
target a religious group or practice, that law would be upheld regardless
of its interference with the free exercise of religion.
The Court in Smith appears to leave an open door for free exercise
challenges to neutral, generally applicable non-criminal laws that burden
or prohibit religiously motivated conduct. If the application of such
laws involves free exercise concerns in conjunction with other consti-
tutional protections, i.e., freedom of speech, freedom of the press or
the right of parents to direct the education of their children, then the
first amendment would bar the application of this law to religiously
motivated action."14 Under this approach, the most a person seeking an
exemption from such a law can hope for is that application of the law
might trigger some other constitutionally protected right in addition to
the now limited free exercise clause. Hopefully, the Court's recognition
of these "hybrid'" situations will grant continued validity to decisions
such as Wisconsin v. Yoder" 6 (invalidating compulsory school attendance
laws as applied to Amish parents who refused to send their children to
school after the eighth grade).
In abandoning the balancing test in cases dealing with a law of
general applicability, the Court in Smith suggested that religious accom-
112. See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 68 S. Ct. 1049 (1948).
113. See Bell v. Wolfish. 441 U.S. 520, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979).
114. Employment Div., Dept. of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1601 (1990).
115. Id. at 1602.
116. 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972).
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modation is best left to the political process."' In other words, state
legislatures rather than the United States Supreme Court should be the
battleground on which fights for nondiscriminatory religious practice
exemptions from generally applicable laws should be fought. The ma-
jority supported the idea that "a society that believes in the negative
protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous
of that value in its legislation."1"8 In making this proposition, the Court
relied on the fact that some states have indeed chosen to make an
exception to their drug laws for sacramental peyote use." 9 However,
this Court was not willing to say that such exceptions are constitutionally
required. Furthermore, in what could possibly be the most controversial
statement made by the Court in Smith, the majority proclaimed:
lilt may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious prac-
tices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable con-
sequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system
in. which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges
weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of
all religious beliefs.12'
The potential consequences of this majoritarian view will later be
examined in conjunction with the implications of leaving the determi-
nation of religious exemptions to the political process.
Implications of Abandoning the Balancing Test
There could possibly be advantages to abandoning the application
of the balancing test in free exercise challenges to generally applicable
criminal laws. One advantage might be a greater degree of predictability
and uniformity in decisions dealing with the free exercise clause. The
balancing process does not lend itself to any great degree of predictability
because a court can manipulate the facts of each particular case in order
to reach whatever conclusion it deems desirable. Second, the Smith
approach might put a halt to the possibility of a judge deciding first
what result he wants to reach and then characterizing the facts in a
way to justify the conclusion. Finally, another possible advantage of
abandoning the balancing process is the creation of an even-handed
standard by which judges can apply the law in free exercise cases. One
might argue that making exemptions to statutory enactments should be
solely within the province of the legislature. The rule in Smith stating






that criminal laws which are neutral and generally applicable are valid,
even as applied against religious activity, bolsters that position by re-
moving the judge's latitude in deciding challenges to these laws.
On the other hand, the disadvantages accompanying the Smith ap-
proach may be devastating to those persons seeking free exercise pro-
tection. Abandoning the balancing process in free exercise challenges to
generally applicable criminal laws removes any elasticity previously avail-
able to courts in deciding such claims. Since no two cases are alike in
every respect, perhaps judges ought to have room to weigh the different
aspects of each case in order to reach a just conclusion. The rule in
Smith does not give judges flexibility in deciding cases that call for
analysis of the distinct characteristics of each claim on a case-by-case
basis.. An additional disadvantage is that any generally applicable criminal
law will be upheld under Smith, regardless of the state interest at stake.
For example, it is understandable that states have a compelling interest
in prohibiting human sacrifices and refuse to exclude them from homicide
laws. However, the same deference arguably ought not to be afforded
to an alcohol consumption law that does not exempt minors who con-
sume wine within the confines of a sacramental communion ceremony.
The most significant disadvantage of the Court's approach in Smith is
that laws targeting certain religious practices may withstand constitutional
challenges under the disguise of general, across-the-board criminal pro-
hibitions. Under Smith, there is no relief for a religious group which
happens to be the only segment of the population that engages in the
prohibited conduct, regardless of how benign the activity may be.
Implications of Leaving Religious Accommodation to the Political
Process
There could possibly be advantages to leaving the determination of
religious exemptions and the accommodation of religious practices to
the political process. Perhaps courts should stay out of the "business
of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims"'2' or
determining sensitive religious issues. Because federal judges are not
elected, those seeking religious exemptions are precluded from having
meaningful participation by choosing those who will determine whether
religious accommodation will be granted. In addition, it can be argued
that the individual states are better equipped to determine the merit of
specific religious exemptions since the legislatures are closer to the people
and more in touch with the needs of their constituents.
Alternatively, there are distinct disadvantages to leaving religious
accommodation to the political process. First of all, without sufficient
121. Id. at 1604 (quoting U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2, 102 S. Ct. 1051, 1058
n.2 (1982)).
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numbers to muster influence over elected officials, it is possible that
the voice of minority religious groups that are not well organized or
highly mobilized will not be heard. Judicial enforcement of the free
exercise clause would protect these minority religious groups from ma-
joritarian intolerance. In this respect, the rule enunciated in Smith has
the potential to make it extremely difficult for those persons or groups
that do not have the strength in numbers or organized efforts to ef-
fectively lobby the legislature and garner enough votes to provide re-
ligious exceptions to otherwise generally applicable laws. As Justice
O'Connor points out in her concurring opinion, "[t]he history of our
free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh impact majoritarian
rule has had on unpopular or emerging religious groups.' '22 Unfortu-
nately, the Court's decision in Smith makes it difficult to alleviate this
impact. Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this decision lies in yet
another possibility. If a state legislature, without justification, refuses
to grant religious accommodation to eliminate an infringement of the
right to free exercise of religion with no justification for refusing such
accommodation, the aggrieved party is left with no alternative but to
wait for the next election.
Conclusion
Undoubtedly, the shift in doctrine in interpreting the free exercise
clause found in Smith could have a tremendous impact on the future
of free exercise claims. No longer will challenges to otherwise valid,
across-the-board applicable, criminal laws be resolved by the courts on
a case-by-case basis using the balancing process set forth under Sherbert
v. Verner.2 1 Rather, those seeking religious accommodation must rely
on the political processes at the state level. Under this approach, it
becomes imperative that state legislatures take over accommodating re-
ligious practices and willingly provide exemptions from laws that burden
religious activity when they are deemed necessary.
Despite the charge of the dissent, the decision in Smith is not merely
an overreaction sparked by the nation's war on drugs.'2 Instead the
approach taken in Smith is identical to that advocated earlier by Justice
Rehnquist in Thomas v. Review Board, Indiana Employment Security
Division.12 There also has been a gradual movement away from an
expansive interpretation of the free exercise clause in areas other than
122. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
123. 374 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790 (1963).,
124. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1616 (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.,
dissenting).




unemployment compensation. However, Smith takes another step in
narrowing the Court's interpretation of the free exercise clause by com-
pletely abandoning the balancing test (for the time being in all cases
outside the unemployment compensation field) which, until now, seemed
to have been firmly embedded in free exercise jurisprudence.
Additionally, the decision in Smith leaves yet another issue unre-
solved: the tension between the free exercise and establishment clauses
of the first amendment. The Court declared that, although not consti-
tutionally required to do so, a state may choose to grant exemptions
to generally applicable criminal laws. However, even such state created
exemptions run afoul of the present interpretation of the establishment
clause.2 6 Until this tension is resolved by mutually consistent interpre-
tation of these clauses, as suggested by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent
in Thomas, even legislatively instituted religious accommodation will be
open to attack under the establishment clause.
It remains to be seen whether the approach taken in Smith will be
limited to situations where a criminal law is being challenged, or if all
laws that are neutral and generally applicable will be subsumed under
this interpretation. The majority did not seem to rely on the fact that
the law under attack was a criminal prohibition. In fact, Smith arose
under circumstances in which the state of Oregon was not even at-
tempting to prosecute the claimants under its criminal prohibition on
peyote use. The criminal law simply served as the basis for denying the
claimants' unemployment compensation benefits. Indeed, the language
used by the Court seems to indicate that this approach will go beyond
the holding in Smith to apply to all free exercise claims that challenge
otherwise valid, generally applicable laws regardless of the nature of the
laws.
Kristie Pospisil
126. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 105 S. Ct. 2914
(1985) (state legislation which gives workers an absolute right to refuse to engage in
employment activities on their Sabbath day violates the establishment clause because it
has the primary effect of advancing religion through an inflexible system of giving
preferences in employment practice to employees with religious beliefs).
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